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**Cheap Talk and Climate Change: A Theory of Discordant Climate Change Policies**

We develop a game-theoretic model of the three parties associated with climate change in the socio-economic political context: the government, the climate scientist, and the median voter. Our model shows that it creates a credibility gap between the climate scientist and the government if the preferences of the climate scientist get further away from the preferences of the government, and it results in smaller ex-post equilibrium quantities of clean energy if the climate scientist gets closer to the left wing. We cannot expect any change in the ex-ante expected quantity of clean energy as the preference of the climate scientist changes. The information on the risk of climate change is perfectly transmitted only if the climate scientist has identical preference with the government; and it that case only, the ex-ante social welfare is maximized. It is not obvious that more political competitiveness and participation regarding climate change lead the government to take more precautionary actions against climate change in our model. However, we show that the climate change policy may not be adjustable to the scientific reports on the risk of climate change if voters do not observe the message from the climate scientist.